Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Typical Spent Fuel Pool - Swimming Not Allowed

The U.S. NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission has this to say about the storage of 'spent fuel':

There are two acceptable storage methods for spent fuel after it is removed from the reactor core:

• Spent Fuel Pools - Currently, most spent nuclear fuel is safely stored in specially designed pools at individual reactor sites around the country.
• Dry Cask Storage - If pool capacity is reached, licensees may move toward use of above-ground dry storage casks.

The Union of Concerned Scientists has this to say:

The Problems with Spent Fuel Pools

When fuel rods in a nuclear reactor are “spent,” or no longer usable, they are removed from the reactor core and replaced with fresh fuel rods. The spent fuel rods are still highly radioactive and thus continue to generate heat for years. The fuel assemblies, which consist of dozens of fuel rods, are moved to pools of water to cool. They are on kept on racks in the pool, and water is continuously circulated to draw heat away from the rods. 

Because no permanent repository for spent fuel exists in the United States (or elsewhere), reactor owners have kept spent fuel at the reactor sites. As the amount of spent fuel has increased, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has authorized many power plant owners to increase the amount in their storage pools to as much as five times what they were designed to hold. As a result, virtually all U.S. spent fuel pools have been “re-racked” to hold spent fuel assemblies at densities that approach those in reactor cores. In order to prevent the spent fuel from going critical, the spent fuel assemblies are placed in metal boxes whose walls contain neutron-absorbing boron

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If a malfunction, a natural disaster, or a terrorist attack causes the water to leak from the pool or the cooling system to stop working, the rods will begin to heat the remaining water in the pool, eventually causing it to boil and evaporate. If the water that leaks or boils away cannot be replaced, the water level will drop, exposing the fuel rods. 

Once the fuel is uncovered, it could become hot enough to suffer damage, which in turn could release large amounts of radioactive gases, such as cesium-137, into the environment. A typical spent fuel pool in the United States holds 1,000 or more tons of fuel, so a radioactive release could be very large.

Spent Fuel Pool Vulnerabilities

The spent fuel pools are located only within the secondary containment of the reactor—the reactor building—and not within the more robust primary containment that is designed to keep radiation released from the reactor vessel during an emergency event from escaping into the environment. Thus, any radiation released from a spent fuel pool is more likely to reach the outside environment than is radiation released from the reactor core. Moreover, because it is outside the primary containment, the spent fuel pool is more vulnerable than the reactor core to terrorist attack. 

Continuing to add spent fuel to these pools compounds this problem by increasing the amount of radioactive material that could be released into the environment. A large radiation release from a spent fuel pool could result in thousands of cancer deaths and hundreds of billions of dollars in decontamination costs and economic damage. The amount of land contaminated by a release from a spent fuel pool could be significantly greater than that contaminated by the Chernobyl disaster. 

Like the cooling system for the reactor core, the cooling system for the spent fuel pools is powered by the electric grid. However, the reactor core cooling system has two back-up power supplies—diesel generators and either a four- or eight-hour DC battery—whereas the spent fuel pool system typically has none. More generally, the industry and the NRC have given little thought to spent fuel pool accidents, and there is virtually no operator training for handling such accidents.

 Dry Cask Storage

Advantages of Dry Cask Storage

The risks from spent fuel in storage pools can be reduced by placing some of it in dry casks. Dry casks are made of steel and concrete, with the concrete providing shielding from radiation, and are stored outdoors on concrete pads. To become cool enough to be placed in the dry casks currently licensed and used in the United States, the spent fuel must first spend about five years in a spent fuel pool. By then it is cool enough that further cooling can be accomplished by natural convection—air flow driven by the decay heat of the spent fuel itself.

By transferring fuel from spent fuel pools to dry casks, plants can lower the risk from spent fuel in several ways: 

First, with less spent fuel remaining in the pools, workers will have more time to cope with a loss of cooling or loss of water from the pool, because the amount of heat released by the spent fuel is lower. With less heat, it takes longer for the water to heat up and boil away. 

Second, if there is less fuel in the pool, it can be spread out more, making it easier for water to cool the fuel. When fuel is densely packed, less water flows past each fuel assembly. 

Third, because there is less fuel in the pool, if workers are unable to prevent an accident, the amount of radioactive gas emitted from the pool will be much lower than it would be otherwise. 

The combination of reducing the likelihood of an event and reducing the consequences of an event significantly reduces the risk from a spent-fuel accident. In contrast to spent fuel pools, dry casks are not vulnerable to loss of coolant because their cooling is passive. 

While dry casks are still vulnerable to safety and security hazards, those risks are reduced. In contrast to the large amount of fuel in a single spent fuel pool, each dry cask only holds about 15 tons of spent fuel. Thus, it would require safety failures at many dry casks to produce the scale of radiological release that could result from a safety failure at one spent fuel pool. Likewise, terrorists would have to break open many dry casks to release as much radioactivity as a single spent fuel pool could release. Therefore, an attack on a dry cask storage area would, in most circumstances, result in a much smaller release of radioactivity than an attack on a storage pool.

UCS recommendations

• All spent fuel should be transferred from wet to dry storage within five years of discharge from the reactor core. This can be achieved with existing technologies.
• The NRC should upgrade existing regulations to require that dry cask storage sites be made more secure against a terrorist attack.
• The NRC should significantly upgrade emergency procedures and operator training for spent fuel pool accidents.

 Source: http://www.ucsusa.org/  Safer Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel Report Updated 03/24/11